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SEAMAN’S MANSLAUGHTER AND CHARTER
BOATS – THE CASE OF UNITED STATES V.
RICHARD SMITH
Alexander Andruzzi1
Abstract
Captain Richard Smith was sailing his charter vessel, Cimarron, along
with a crew from Camden, Maine to St. John, U.S. Virgin Islands for
the winter season. During the voyage, Smith stopped in Beaufort, North
Carolina, and picked up David Pontious who would join the crew for
the remainder of the journey. Shortly after joining the crew, Pontious
began experiencing hallucinations and sickness, culminating in
Pontious attacking Smith. After the altercation was broken up, Pontious
jumped overboard and drowned. Smith never made an attempt to assist
Pontious and waited until the next day to radio for assistance. Upon the
Cimarron’s arrival in the U.S. Virgin Islands, Smith was arrested and
charged under a rarely used statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1115, commonly
known as Seaman’s Manslaughter. After a trial, Smith’s attorney filed
a motion for judgment of acquittal, pursuant to Rule 29 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure on the ground that the statute only applies
to commercial vessels. Over the Government’s objection, the motion
was granted. Applying two cannons of statutory interpretation, ejusdem
generis and noscitur a sociis, Smith contended that in order to be
convicted under § 1115, the vessel needed to be engaged in commercial
activity. This includes carrying passengers or cargo for pay.
Accordingly, because the Cimarron, was not being paid to transport
any passengers or cargo, and no members of the crew were being paid,
the Court accepted Smith’s argument that the Cimarron was not
engaged in commercial activity and therefore § 1115 is inapplicable.

1
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I. INTRODUCTION
When charter boat captain Richard Smith began his annual
voyage from Camden, Maine to St. John, U.S. Virgin Islands in the
fall of 2015, nothing seemed out of the ordinary. 2 Smith had made
this voyage to St. John every year since 2005 where he operated a
charter boat business during the winter months. 3 On October 22,
2015, Smith docked his vessel, the S/V Cimarron, in Beaufort,
North Carolina where David Pontious joined Smith’s crew –
replacing a crew member. 4 Shortly after joining the crew of the
Cimarron, Pontious became “seasick and dehydrated,” and began
hallucinating.5 In particular, the other crewmembers reported that
Pontious believed he had been drugged and kidnapped by the crew
of the Cimarron.6 The next day, Pontious reportedly began to hear
voices.7
On October 25, the Cimarron was approximately 300 miles
off shore and Pontious’ condition had deteriorated substantially. 8 In
an apparent attempt to take control of the Cimarron, Pontious
allegedly attacked Smith, choking the captain. 9 After other crew
members intervened in this attack on Smith, Pontious allegedly
Lauren Abbate, Captain of Camden Charter Vessel Charged with Seaman’s
Manslaughter, Detained in Virgin Islands, Bangor Daily News (Nov. 20, 2018),
https://bangordailynews.com/2018/11/20/news/midcoast/captain-of-camdencharter-vessel-charged-with-seamans-manslaughter-detained-in-virgin-islands/,
[https://perma.cc/FR5V-7Y8S].
3 Eric Russell, Prosecution Lays Out Case Against Camden Charter Boat
Captain Charged in 2015 Death, Portland Press Herald (Dec. 19, 2018),
https://www.pressherald.com/2018/12/19/prosecution-lays-out-case-againstcamden-sailboat-captain-charged-in-2015-death/?rel=related,
[https://perma.cc/J82W-KV9L].
4 Indictment, United States v. Richard Smith, No. 3:18-CR-00026-CVG-RM (D.
V.I. Jul. 12, 2018), Doc. No. 1; see also Russell, supra note 2.
5 Indictment, United States v. Richard Smith, No. 3:18-CR-00026-CVG-RM (D.
V.I. Jul. 12, 2018), Doc. No. 1.
6 Abbate, supra note 1.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Eric Russell, Camden Charter Boat Captain Acquitted in Unusual
Manslaughter Case, Portland Press Herald, (Jan. 9, 2019),
https://www.pressherald.com/2019/01/09/camden-charter-boat-acquitted-inseamans-manslaughter-case/, [https://perma.cc/28KJ-UVJM].
2
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jumped overboard, struck his head on the railing of the Cimarron,
and never surfaced. 10 It is undisputed that Smith did not make
contact with authorities to report the incident until the next day,
although Smith maintains that he had attempted to make contact
with the United States Coast Guard, but only got static. 11 Upon the
Cimarron’s arrival in St. John on November 2, 2015, Smith was
arrested and charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1115, a criminal
statute which prohibits what has become to be known as “Seaman’s
Manslaughter.”12
After the third day of the jury trial in the U.S. District Court
for the Virgin Islands, Smith’s attorneys moved for a judgment of
acquittal before the case was submitted to the jury for
deliberations.13 The Defendant’s motion put forth three arguments:
first, the defense argued that the October voyage was not a
“commercial voyage,” and therefore Smith could not be convicted
under 18 U.S.C. § 1115;14 second, the motion contended there was
insufficient evidence presented that Smith was the direct cause of
Pontious’ death; 15 and finally, the defense argued that Smith did not
owe a duty of care to Pontious after Pontious attempted a mutiny. 16
The District Court granted Smith’s motion, and Smith was acquitted
of Seaman’s Manslaughter in the death of David Pontious.17
The focus of this case note will be on the first argument
presented in Smith’s motion for judgment of acquittal – whether or
not the voyage in October 2015 was, in fact, a commercial voyage
such that Smith cannot be guilty under 18 U.S.C. § 1115. In
particular, this Note contends that, despite a strong policy argument
to the contrary, the trial judge correctly decided the issue of whether
the October voyage constituted a “commercial voyage” within the
meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1115.
Id.
Abbate, supra note 1.
12 Russell, supra note 8.
13 Def.’s Mot. J. Acquittal, United States v. Richard Smith, No. 3:18-CR-00026CVG-RM (D. V.I. Jan. 8, 2019) [hereinafter Def. Mot.].
14 Id. at 3.
15 Id. at 8.
16Id. at 10.
17 Russell, supra note 8.
10
11
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II. HISTORY OF THE SEAMAN’S MANSLAUGHTER LAWS
18 U.S.C. § 1115 has undergone several changes since its
first version was implemented in 1838, primarily dealing with the
breadth of jurisdiction of the statute. The first iteration of
section1115 came into existence in 1838.18 Initially, the early
version of § 1115 appeared in the comprehensive “Act of July 17”
and was entitled “An Act to Provide for the Better Security of the
Lives of Passengers on Board Vessels Propelled in Whole or in Part
by Steam.”19 The Act was a direct response to the increasing number
of deaths that were occurring aboard steamships and “provided for
the prosecution of officers or crewmen whose negligence caused the
death of any person aboard their vessel.” 20
Following the passage of the 1838 Act, Congress enacted an
independent statute in 1871 to promote the safety and “security of
Life” aboard steamships. 21 Of note, Section 57 of the Act of 1871
provided a mechanism for addressing the loss of life as a result of
the negligence of a person employed on a steamship.22 In 1874,
Congress codified Section 57 of the Act as section 5344 in the
Revised Statutes of 1874, and moved it to a chapter “concerning
crimes occurring within the maritime and territorial jurisdiction of
the United States.”23 Interestingly, unlike other statutes in the same
chapter, such as those prohibiting murder, Section 5344 did not
contain an express prohibition of “federal jurisdiction over

United States v. Allied Towing Corp., 602 F.2d 612, 614 (4th Cir. 1979); see
also Allison Fish, The Potential Application of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1115 to Offshore
Drilling Disasters: A Requiem for the Seaman's Manslaughter Act, 39 TUL.
MAR. L.J. 241, 242 (2014) [hereinafter Potential Application of 18 U.S.C. S
1115 to Offshore Drilling Disasters].
19 United States v. Holmes, 104 F. 884, 885 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1900).
20 Allied Towing Corp., 602 F.2d at 614 (citing Act of July 7, 1838, ch. 191, § 2,
5 Stat. 304); see also Fish, Potential Application of 18 U.S.C. S 1115 to Offshore
Drilling Disasters at 242 (noting that there were more than two thousand deaths
aboard steamboats prior to the passage of the Act of July 7).
21 Allied Towing Corp., 602 F.2d at 614.
22 Id.
23 Fish, Potential Application of 18 U.S.C. S 1115 to Offshore Drilling Disasters
at 243.
18
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violations occurring on waters within the jurisdiction of any state.” 24
This may be evidence of Congress’ intent to have a broad statute
covering incidents arising anywhere “within the general admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction.”25
The reach of section 5344 was substantially limited in 1909
with the statute’s codification in Section 282 of the Criminal Code,
which made the statute “subject to the definition of the special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction.” 26 Therefore, “the law no
longer applied to homicides committed on waters within the
territorial jurisdiction of any state.”27 This jurisdictional restriction
remained in place during the recodification of the criminal code in
1926, but was removed in 1948.28 In 1948, the modern version of
the Seaman’s Manslaughter Act was codified as a statute of general
application as 18 U.S.C. § 1115.
In its current version, 18 U.S.C. § 1115 reads, in relevant
part, as follows:
Every captain, engineer, pilot, or other person employed on
any steamboat or vessel, by whose misconduct, negligence,
or inattention to his duties on such vessel the life of any
person is destroyed, and every owner, charterer, inspector,
or other public officer, through whose fraud, neglect,
connivance, misconduct, or violation of law the life of any
person is destroyed, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. 29
Of note, “[u]nlike the common law definition of
manslaughter and the companion statutory definition for general
manslaughter . . . Section 1115 only requires the proof of any degree
of negligence to meet the culpability threshold.”30 This lower
Allied Towing Corp, 602 F.2d at 614.
Fish, Potential Application of 18 U.S.C. S 1115 to Offshore Drilling Disasters
at 243.
26 Allied Towing Corp., 602 F.2d at 615.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 18 U.S.C. § 1115 (2016).
30 United States v. Kaluza, 780 F.3d 647, 657 (5th Cir. 2015).
24
25
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threshold for culpability was used by Smith’s attorneys to argue that
the applicability of section 1115 should be limited to commercial
vessels.31
III. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Courts addressing the application of 18 U.S.C. § 1115 have
been clear that the text of the statute is ambiguous. 32 The language
of a statute is considered ambiguous when it is “susceptible to more
than one reasonable interpretation or more than one accepted
meaning.”33 To determine the meaning of ambiguous language in
the context of section 1115, courts have typically invoked two
canons of interpretation: ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis.34
Ejusdem generis is used when “general words follow an
enumeration of specific terms.” 35 In this situation, “the general
words are read to apply only to other items like those specifically
enumerated.”36 It is important to note that these canons are limited,
however. Specifically, “the rule[s] cannot be used to ‘obscure and
defeat the intent and purpose of Congress’ or ‘render general words
meaningless.’”37 Furthermore, “[t]he limiting principle of ejusdem
generis has particular force with respect to criminal statutes, which
courts are compelled to construe rigorously in order to protect
unsuspecting citizens from being ensnared by ambiguous statutory
language.”38 Of particular importance in Smith is whether the term
“captain” in section 1115 is limited to a captain employed on a
commercial vessel. 39 Without this reading, the word “captain” may
Def. Mot. at 7.
Kaluza, 780 F.Supp. at 658.
33 Id.
34 Id. (using the canons to assess whether an offshore oil rig constitutes a
“vessel” which is covered under 18 U.S.C. § 1115); United States v. LaBrecque,
419 F.Supp. 430, 434 (D. N.J. 1976) (invoking the canons when addressing the
question of whether the captain of a pleasure vessel may be charged under 18
U.S.C. § 1115).
35 Kaluza, 780 F.Supp. at 660–661 (internal quotation omitted).
36 Id. at 661 (internal quotation omitted).
37 Id. (quoting Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142. 163
(2012).
38 Id. (quoting United States v. Insco, 496 F.2d 204, 206 (5th Cir. 1974)).
39 Def. Mot. at 3.
31
32
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be applicable to all vessels, not just commercial vessels, and Smith
could be held liable.40
The other canon, noscitur a sociis, “is employed to ascertain
the meaning of an ambiguous or doubtful word.” 41 To obtain the
meaning of the “ambiguous or doubtful word,” that word must be
read with “reference to other words with which it is associated.” 42
Simply put, noscitur a sociis requires ambiguous words to be
viewed in light of the other words associated with it.
To illustrate, in the case of Smith, the canon of ejusdem
generis is used to determine if the words in the phrase “[e]very
captain, engineer, pilot, or other person employed on any steamboat
or vessel” in section 1115 are read individually or as a list. In other
words, whether the word “captain” is read on its own, or in
conjunction with “other person employed on any steamboat or
vessel.” If “captain” is read on its own, any captain – whether
employed on a commercial vessel or not – would be liable under §
1115. However, if read in conjunction with the other words in the
list, as noscitur a sociis demands, then only those captains employed
on commercial vessels would be subject to punishment under
section 1115.
IV. UNITED STATES V. LABRECQUE
Relying principally on United States v. LaBrecque, Smith’s
counsel argued that the vessel could not meet the definition of a
“commercial vessel” for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1115 because
of the absence of paying passengers or cargo on the Cimarron and
the lack of evidence that Smith was “employed” as a captain on the
Cimarron.43 The facts of LaBrecque are remarkably similar to those
of the Smith case.
In LaBrecque, the defendant, Cyril LaBrecque, was the
owner of a sailing schooner, the Saddie and Edgar. LaBrecque,
See generally, LaBrecque, 419 F.Supp. at 434.
LaBrecque, 419 F.Supp. at 434.
42 Id.
43 Def. Mot. at 7.
40
41
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along with his wife Jessie, had planned a voyage to sail the Sadie
and Edgar from Connecticut to Florida. 44 Accompanying the
LaBrecques on their voyage were the first mate, the LaBrecque’s
Labrador retriever, and three recent high school graduates, Michael
Riker, Paul Sagarino, and Bradford Blakely, who comprised the
Sadie and Edgar’s crew.45 Similar to the crewmembers in Smith,
Riker, Sagarino, and Blakely were onboard the vessel as crew but
were not paid for their services.46 Only a relatively small part of the
voyage in LaBrecque, the stretch from Sandy Hook, Connecticut to
Atlantic City, New Jersey, was to take place on the ocean. 47
Once the Sadie and Edgar was on the ocean, it encountered
inclement weather and began to take on water.48 Eventually, the
crew found themselves in the water and only a small skiff was
available for all five people as well as the Labrador.49 Sagarino and
Blakely were forced to stay in the cold water alongside the skiff for
approximately twelve hours while the LaBrecques, Riker, and the
Labrador were in the skiff.50 Sagarino and Blakely died.51
Cyril LaBrecque was ultimately charged with one count of
Seaman’s Manslaughter pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1115.52 Like
defense counsel in Smith, LaBrecque’s attorneys filed a motion for
judgment of acquittal on the grounds that section 1115 only applies
to commercial vessels; and, since there were no paying passengers
or cargo aboard the Sadie and Edgar, section 1115 is inapplicable. 53
The LaBrecque Court granted the motion.54 Given the similarities in
factual circumstances between Smith and LaBrecque as well as
Smith’s reliance on the reasoning presented in LaBrecque, the
Court’s reasoning in LaBrecque bears repeating.
LaBrecque, 419 F.Supp. at 432.
Id. at 431.
46 Id. at 434.
47 Id. at 432.
48 Id. at 433.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 431.
53 Id. at 434.
54 Id. at 439.
44
45
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LaBrecque’s primary contention was identical to Smith’s:
“the word ‘captain’ must be interpreted with reference to the words
‘other person employed.’”55 This reading of “captain,” according to
LaBrecque, required a finding that section 1115 only applies to
“vessels engaged in commercial activity.” 56 To assess the validity of
LaBrecque’s argument, the Court turned to ejusdem generis and
noscitur a sociis.57 Based off of the construction of the phrase in
question, as well as the relevant legislative history, the Court in
LaBrecque determined that the word “captain” only applies to
captains employed on commercial vessels or engaged in commercial
activity and, therefore, granted LaBrecque’s motion for judgment of
acquittal.58
V. HOOPENGARNER V. UNITED STATES
Although the majority of cases dealing with the issue have
concluded that only vessels engaged in commercial activity are
covered by 18 U.S.C. § 1115, 59 the 1959 case of Hoopengarner
came to a different conclusion. 60 Hoopengarner presents a stark
contrast to LaBrecque and may present an alternative to the use of
ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis for courts deciding issues of
applicability for section1115.
In Hoopengarner, a cabin cruiser with several individuals
onboard was on a fishing trip on Lake St. Clair off the coast of
Michigan.61 Benjamin Hoopengarner, the defendant, was also
boating in his speedboat. 62 At approximately 9:00 PM,
Hoopengarner’s speedboat collided with the cabin cruiser and
several individuals were thrown from their vessels – including Mr.
Id. at 434; see also Def. Mot. at 6.
LaBrecque, 419 F.Supp. at 434.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Def.’s Mot. at 6 (citing United States v. O’Keefe, 426 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir.
2005); United States v. Shroder, 2006 WL 1663663 at *2 (S.D. Ala. June 12,
2006).
60 Hoopengarner v. United States, 270 F.2d 465 (6th Cir. 1959).
61 Hoopengarner, 270 F.2d at 467.
62 Id.
55
56
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Hoopengarner.63 Shortly after the collision, other boats on Lake St.
Clair made their way toward the site of the collision and attempted
to rescue the people thrown into the water. 64 Unfortunately,
however, Virginia Ward was struck by a boat coming to her rescue
and was killed.65 Hoopengarner was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1115
for her death and he was found guilty in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. 66 Hoopengarner
appealed to the Sixth Circuit. 67
Hoopengarner raised five issues on appeal: first, the federal
charges violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment because he had already been tried by a state court; 68
second, “the Constitution, as well as the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, required dismissal of the indictment;” 69 third, lack of
jurisdiction by the District Court; fourth, that his conduct “was not
the proximate cause of the death of Virginia Ward;”70 and finally,
that the District Court “abused its discretion by failing to suspend
the sentence.”71 The third issue raised on appeal is the only issue
that presents the potential to support the Government’s argument in
Smith’s case.
Interestingly, Hoopengarner never explicitly raised the
argument that 18 U.S.C. § 1115 only applies to commercial
vessels.72 However, in addressing the jurisdictional issue raised by
Hoopengarner, the Court concluded that because the vessel was
“registered, licensed, and enrolled under the laws of the United
States,”73 courts had jurisdiction to enforce criminal penalties
against those operating vessels – regardless of whether the vessel
was commercial or not.74
Id.
Id.
65 Id. at 468.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 467.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 See generally, id.
73 Id. at 471.
74 Id.
63
64
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Hoopengarner, therefore, greatly expanded the scope of 18
U.S.C. § 1115, even if it did so inadvertently. Nevertheless,
Hoopengarner’s conviction was upheld and remains the only
prosecution to be “leveled regarding a non-commercial voyage.”75
Although Hoopengarner did uphold the conviction of Benjamin
Hoopengarner under section 1115, the Hoopengarner Court was not
presented with, and thus did not make any determinations regarding,
the issue of the commercial status of Hoopengarner’s vessel. Rather,
it did so on grounds other than vessel status and thus does not
squarely address the issue set forth in LaBrecque and Smith.
In sum, Hoopengarner is the sole case to sustain a conviction
of an individual not engaged in commercial activity under section
1115.76 However, because Hoopengarner did not specifically
address the issue raised in LaBrecque and Smith, its support as a
counterargument is minimal. 77 In fact, in LaBrecque, the Court
noted that “[w]hile Hoopengarner implicitly sanctioned the
prosecution of a pleasure boat owner, it seems to represent an
unwarranted (and perhaps unintentional) extension of the statute to
cover a type of situation not intended by Congress.”78
VI. APPLICATION TO UNITED STATES V. RICHARD SMITH
The facts of the case against Richard Smith are not in
dispute. Richard Smith’s vessel, the Cimarron, was not engaged in
commercial activity for the purposes of section1115 because it was
not “carrying passengers or cargo for pay.” 79 Pontious was merely
receiving free passage aboard the Cimarron.80 Furthermore, as the
defense alleged, “there was no evidence to show that Smith was
‘employed’ as a captain on the Cimarron at the time of the
incident.”81
Def.’s Mot. at 6, n. 1.
Def.’s Mot. at 6, n. 1.
77 LaBrecque, 419 F.Supp. at 435.
78 Id.
79 Def.’s Mot. at 7.
80 Id.
81 Id.
75
76
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Additionally, an important factual point to note is that the
government’s expert at trial admitted during his testimony “that the
Cimarron was not a commercial vessel at the time Pontious jumped
overboard.”82 This admission from the government’s expert
undoubtedly had a substantial negative impact on the government’s
case. The testimony of the government’s expert and the Defense’s
argument lead to the conclusion that the commercial status of the
vessel may change depending on the presence of paying passengers
or cargo.83 In other words, if Pontious had paid to be aboard the
Cimarron, with all other facts being the same, section 1115 would
likely apply.84 Against this backdrop, the canons of statutory
construction outlined above are necessary to determine if, in fact,
section 1115 only applies to commercial vessels.85 If the answer is
“yes,” then the District Court reached the correct conclusion in
granting the Defense’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal – in spite
of strong policy arguments to the contrary.
The issue still remains, however, whether or not section
1115 applies solely to commercial vessels. Based on the multiple
interpretations of the statute that are present, it is clear, as other
courts who have addressed the issue have mentioned, that the statute
is ambiguous when it comes to the application of section1115 to
noncommercial vessels. 86 Thus, utilizing ejusdem generis and
noscitur a sociis are necessary.
In the case of section 1115, the words “captain,” “engineer,”
and “pilots” are the specific terms and “other persons employed on
any steamboat or vessel” are the general terms. 87 Using ejusdem
generis, the term captain, a specific term, is limited by the general
terms, “other persons employed on a vessel.” At this point, noscitur
a sociis can be invoked to ascertain the meaning of the term
“captain” with reference to the “other words with which it is
Id.
Id.
84 Id.
85 Kaluza, 780 F.Supp. at 658.
86 See, e.g., Kaluza, 780 F.Supp.; LaBrecque, 419 F.Supp.
87 LaBrecque, 419 F.Supp. at 434; see also Fish, supra note 17, at 243.
82
83
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associated, here ‘other persons employed.’” 88 Based on the context
within which the term “captain” appears in section 1115, as well as
the statutory history of section 1115, it is clear that the term
“captain” is limited to those “employed” on vessels or steamboats.
In fact, an argument could be made that based on legislative intent
alone, section 1115 is limited in application to commercial vessels.
As noted in Section I, supra, Congress enacted the earliest iteration
of section 1115 in direct response to a rise in deaths aboard
commercial steamboats. This history, taken in conjunction with the
canons of interpretation of ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis,
presents a compelling argument that section 1115 should be limited
in its application to captains engaged in commercial activity.
Based on these principles, the District Court reached the
correct legal conclusion when it granted the Defendant’s Motion for
Judgment of Acquittal. At the time that Pontious died, the Cimarron
was not carrying any passengers or cargo for pay, nor was Smith
being paid to perform his duties as captain. 89 Thus, the District Court
had no other viable alternative than to grant the Defendant’s Motion.
VII. EXPANSION OF § 1115 TO NONCOMMERCIAL VESSELS
Based on the aforementioned principles and legislative
history, the Court in Smith reached the correct conclusion –
application of section 1115 is limited to vessels engaged in
commercial activity. The question then becomes: should it be?
Regardless of the interpretation of an ambiguous statute, the realworld consequences of not being able to hold captains of
noncommercial vessels criminally liable for their negligence thrusts
an important policy question to the forefront of the Smith case. There
are two specific questions related to this. First, whether section 1115
may apply when a vessel has been, or will be, used for commercial
purposes, even if not engaged in commercial activity at the time of
an individual’s death. Second, whether there is a need for
Congressional action to expand the reach of section 1115 to
expressly include noncommercial vessels.
LaBrecque, 419 F.Supp. at 434 (citing Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S.
303, 307 (1961)).
89 Def.’s Mot. at 7.
88
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It is uncontroverted that David Pontious became ill and
eventually attacked Richard Smith. 90 However, it is equally clear
that when Pontious jumped overboard into the Atlantic Ocean,
Richard Smith kept sailing the Cimarron to the Virgin Islands and
made no attempt to locate Pontious or render effective assistance. 91
This conduct falls beneath the standard set by the manslaughter
statute, codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1112,92 and thus left prosecutors one
option for holding Smith criminally liable for the death of David
Pontious: Seaman’s Manslaughter. 93 Additionally, “the judge’s
ruling is not subject to appeal and the statute of limitations for a civil
lawsuit has expired.”94
Based on the Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal,
the significant question is whether the individual was engaged in
commercial activity at the time that the individual died as a result of
another’s negligence.95 It has been argued that the lower standard of
negligence required for conviction under section1115 is evidence
that the statute should only apply to a limited category of vessels
and individuals, namely those engaged in commercial activity at the
Eric Russell, Prosecution Lays Out Case Against Camden Charter Boat
Captain Charged in 2015 Death, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Dec. 20, 2018),
https://www.pressherald.com/2018/12/19/prosecution-lays-out-case-againstcamden-sailboat-captain-charged-in-2015-death/, [https://perma.cc/7KHZKJFN].
91 Id.
92 The statute provides:
90

Manslaughter is the killing of a human being without malice. It is of
two kinds: Voluntary – upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.
Involuntary – In the commission of an unlawful act not amount to a
felony, or in the commission in an unlawful manner, or without due
caution and circumspection, of a lawful act which might produce death.
“Section 1115 requires a lower degree of negligence to be proven to sustain a
conviction than its sister statute Title 18 USC § 1112 which incorporated
elements of common law manslaughter.” Philip H. Hilder & Paul L. Creech,
Seaman’s Manslaughter: The Criminalization of Death by Negligence, 3,
https://www.hilderlaw.com/Publications/ (last visited April 13, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/R5KY-WBNZ].
94 Russell, supra note 8.
95 Def.’s Mot. at 7.
93

216

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 25:1

time of an individual’s death.96 Accordingly, if the government
wants to prosecute a captain of a noncommercial vessel for
manslaughter, it would be required to meet the higher standard set
forth by section 1112.97
The issue presented by Smith is that the Cimarron would
likely qualify as a commercial vessel in other contexts. For example,
if Smith had been hired by an individual as a charter captain, the
Cimarron would undoubtedly be acting as a commercial vessel and
section 1115 would apply. The Cimarron is not a traditional
“noncommercial” vessel because it was not used for Smith’s
pleasure.98 Rather, Smith used the Cimarron for commercial
purposes by getting paid to transport passengers—he just was not
doing so at the time of Pontious’ death. 99 Simply put, the gap
between sections 1112 and 1115 effectively leave certain “off-duty”
commercial vessels immune from criminal liability. And, in this
case, there were also no civil repercussions for Smith because
Pontious’ family did not bring a civil suit within the applicable
statute of limitations.
Although prosecutions under section 1115 are on the rise,100
cases like Smith present a compelling reason for the expansion of
section 1115. The limited application of section 1115 to commercial
vessels stems in part from the fact that their “operators and owners,
historically speaking, ‘daily have the lives of thousands of helpless
humans [sic] beings in their keeping.’” 101 However, “off-duty”
charter boat captains like Richard Smith are seemingly relieved of
all criminal liability for deaths resulting from their negligence, while
still being able to transport numerous passengers as long as they are
not paying. As noted previously, in its Motion for Judgment of
Acquittal, the defense relied heavily on LaBrecque.102 Yet the vessel
in LaBrecque was not a charter vessel, but purely a pleasure
Id. (citing United States v. O’Keefe, 426 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 2005)).
Hilder & Creech, supra note 87, at 3.
98 Abbate, supra note 1.
99 Id.
100 Jeanne M. Grasso, Law and Order: The Emergence of the Seaman’s
Manslaughter Statute, 3 Benedict’s Maritime Bulletin, 170, 171 (2005).
101 United States v. O’Keefe, 426 F.3d 274, 278, n. 1 (5th Cir. 2005).
102 Def.’s Mot. at 6.
96
97
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vessel.103 Therefore, while the victims in LaBrecque were
nonpaying passengers assisting in the journey like those in Smith,
the vessel in LaBrecque would never qualify as a commercial vessel
for liability under section 1115.
Based on the reasoning presented by Congress for the
Seaman’s Manslaughter statutes, owners and operators of charter
vessels not operating in their direct commercial capacity should still
be subject to liability under section 1115. “Negligence occurs when
there is a breach of duty, which is an omission to perform an act or
to act in violation of a standard of care that is made to govern and
control the manner of the discharge of a duty.” 104 In the context of
section 1115, the duty is shown by the vessel’s status as a
commercial, rather than pleasure vessel, because “owners,
operators, and inspectors of commercial vessels have [a] unique
responsibility or fiduciary duty to those who are killed because of
the misconduct or violations of standards of care.”105 When a charter
vessel is carrying nonpaying passengers during a voyage from one
place of operation to another – as Smith was doing – a vessel’s
owner or an operator’s duty of care does not cease to exist. Not only
can the voyage arguably be considered “commercial” in the general
sense of the word, but charter boat owners and operators should be
considered subject to criminal liability under section 1115 even
when the vessel is not being directly operated in its commercial
capacity for reasons of public policy.
Therefore, while the Smith Court did reach the correct
conclusion based on caselaw, section 1115 should be rewritten to
include “off-duty” commercial vessels like the Cimarron in order to
promote accountability for deaths resulting from negligence.
While there is a compelling case to be made for expanding
the application of section 1115 to charter and other vessels not
directly operating in their commercial capacity, application of
section 1115 to strictly pleasure vessels is unsupported by the
LaBrecque, 419 F.Supp. at 437.
Hilder & Creech, supra note 87, at 3.
105 Id.
103
104
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legislative intent.106 Furthermore, aside from the Hoopengarner
case, there is no caselaw to support the application of section 1115
to strictly pleasure vessels. Individuals who own and operate vessels
strictly for pleasure are not subject to the “unique responsibilit[ies]
and fiduciary dut[ies]” that their commercial counterparts are. 107
The unique circumstances of a charter boat captain like Smith, or a
similarly situated operator of a commercial vessel, is that they are
subject to those duties giving rise to liability under section 1115 at
any point.
The case for not extending criminal liability for negligence
cannot be complete, however, without mentioning the number of
fatalities that occur during the operation of pleasure vessels in the
United States. According to the United States Coast Guard, there
were a total of 2,480 accidents in 2017 resulting from operation of a
vessel.108 There were 1,727 injuries as a result and 295 deaths. 109
The leading cause of fatalities in recreational boating is alcohol use
by the operator, followed by “operator inexperience.”110 If section
1115 were to be expanded to include pleasure vessels, there would
be criminal liability under the lower negligence standard for the
deaths of individuals resulting from causes such as operator
inexperience.
Although a seemingly attractive option to combat deaths
resulting from the negligent operation of noncommercial pleasure
vessels, the legislative intent does not support an expansion of
section 1115 to impose liability for these deaths.111 Therefore, while
Congress would possess the power to criminalize these offenses if
they occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
See, Grasso, supra note 94, at 170; Fish, supra note 17, at 242-44; Hilder &
Creech, supra note 87, at 1.
107 O’Keefe, 426 F.3d at 278, n. 1; see also Hilder & Creech, supra note 87, at 3.
106

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD,
2017 Recreational Boating Statistics, 20 (2018),
https://www.uscgboating.org/library/accident-statistics/Recreational-BoatingStatistics-2017.pdf, [https://perma.cc/N3WQ-H2J4].
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Grasso, supra note 94, at 170.
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States,112 this legislation would not fit within the scope of section
1115’s original intent.
VIII. CONCLUSION
When Richard Smith embarked on his annual voyage from
Camden, Maine to St. John, U.S. Virgin Islands, he was not engaged
in commercial activity for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1115,
otherwise known as Seaman’s Manslaughter. As a result, when
David Pontious, who was not paying to be aboard the Cimarron,
attacked Smith and then ultimately jumped overboard into the
Atlantic Ocean, Smith was not subject to liability under section
1115. Judge Curtis Gomez, relying on substantial caselaw, reached
the correct conclusion in granting Smith’s Motion for Judgment of
Acquittal.
While Judge Gomez reached the correct conclusion, Smith’s
case presents an opportunity for Congress to clarify the scope of §
1115 and to include “off-duty” commercial vessels, such as the
Cimarron at the time of Pontious’ death. This minor expansion
would fit within the original intent of Congress when it first enacted
section 1115’s predecessor, while keeping the scope of the statute
narrow enough to justify the lower mens rea. The application of §
1115 derives from the higher duty of care that owners and operators
of commercial vessels are subject to. For reasons of public policy,
this duty should not be washed away simply because an individual
was engaged in activity that was only tangentially related to
commerce at a specific time. Although section 1115’s scope should
be expanded to include “off-duty” commercial vessels, it should not
include vessels that are strictly pleasure vessels with no commercial
purpose. This expansion cannot be supported by Congress’ original
intent.

112

Fish, supra note 17, at 244, n. 17.

